

INDIA AND BURMA

- 2 -

Colonel Donovan

January 23, 1943

people who could perform the dual function of working in India and being sure there were no Indian log-jams on our Asiatic endeavors.

3. However, I believe we are short of personnel and the personnel problem would be a major one.

R. Davis Halliwell



cc: Mr. Poynter
Captain Devlin

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 23, 1953

SECRET

Memorandum to Colonel William J. Denevan
From: R. Davis Halliwell
Subject: OCS Liaison Mission in India

1. The following communication from Colonel
Lewent-Scott has been received:

"I have to inform you that I have today re-
ceived a telegram from my people in London stating that,
after a discussion with Mr. [redacted] left London, a discussion
took place between him and my chief regarding the estab-
lishment of the [redacted] of an OCS Liaison Mission for [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted].

On the [redacted] of this discussion, we [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted] of our [redacted] in New Delhi for [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] to the effect that [redacted] would
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] that
the [redacted] [redacted].

I will of course let you know as soon as
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]."

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

11,074
 * OSS Representative

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel W. J. Donovan
 FROM: Whitney H. Sheperdson
 SUBJECT:

DATE: March 24, 1943

Mr. Francis Miller informs me that in the conversation which you had with General Magruder, Mr. Hutcheson and him regarding India on March 17, you expressed an interest in the possibility of sending three or four R. & A. men to work in relation to Mr. Phillips' office.

The British Section of S.I. hopes that agreement to this proposal can be secured as rapidly as possible. I am informed that one man is already available for this mission.

I assume that you have cabled Mr. Phillips about this, and that you will let me know as soon as you receive a reply.

WHS

To Ned Boulton —

Dear you know
 I would be extremely
 A to then

Ind. 1001, 074
P. 1001, 074
X OSS R. 1001, 074

March 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel William J. Donovan
FROM: G. Edward Buxton
SUBJECT: Attached memo from Mr. Shepardson

I would send the one man stated to be available whenever you receive word from Mr. Phillips that he is wanted. I would then await a report from such representative as to the work he is doing and the opportunity for further useful expansion.

ASD.
GEB

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BRITISH MOST SECRET

7. The concurrence of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff is sought to the above proposals. If agreed to, these proposals will be communicated by the British Chiefs of Staff to the Viceroy and General Wavell. It is suggested that they should similarly be communicated by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff to General Stilwell and the U. S. authorities in India concerned.

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Burma:

It was agreed that Burma should be a British area but that American S.O. should have the right of working into it as convenient from China."

4. The British Chiefs of Staff welcome the setting up in India of an O.S.S. Mission as suggested by Mr. Phillips for purely liaison purposes, but could not agree to any new O.S.S. organization undertaking S.I.S. or S.O.E. operations in or from India. Such activities would involve overlapping and consequent waste of valuable equipment and personnel and might well entail conflicting information reaching Washington from India.

5. They consider that to insure that all available information is properly collated and evaluated, the new O.S.S. Mission should be linked with the Observer Group under Colonel Oaman. To insure that a complete coordinated picture reaches Washington the Joint Intelligence Committee (India) as the authority responsible for presenting the full intelligence picture of the Indian Command, should be kept informed of the material despatched to Washington by the Liaison Mission of the Office of Strategic Services in order that deficiencies in information or divergencies in interpretation can be adjusted to insure a common picture.

6. With regard to Colonel Kiffner's group, agreement in principle has been given to the operating from India into Burma, to also operate from China into Burma. The British Chiefs of Staff cannot agree, however, to a continuation of the present arrangements whereby Colonel Kiffner's operations into Burma from India are not controlled and co-ordinated by General Wavell through his head of S.O.E. in India. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that the activities of Colonel Kiffner's group from India into Burma must come under the general control and co-ordination of S.O.E. India.

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COPY NO.

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C.C.S. 196April 8, 1943.COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFO.S.S. ORGANIZATION IN INDIA

Note by the Representatives of the
British Chiefs of Staff.

1. It is understood that Mr. Phillips, the U. S. Representative at New Delhi, has asked the Viceroy's agreement to the establishment in New Delhi of a small branch of the Office of Strategic Services to consist of one liaison officer each with S I.S. and S.O.E. together with microfilm experts. This office, it is understood, would be for the purpose of liaison rather than operations.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff welcome any measures designed to improve liaison on S.I.S. and S.O.E. matters, and suggest that in connection with the above request the position of all O.S.S. representatives in India and Burma should be considered in order to insure that the maximum degree of coordination is assured.

3. The agreement reached between the Office of Strategic Services and the British Special Operations Executive in September 1942 reads as follows with regard to India and Burma:

"India:

It was agreed that India should be regarded as a British area where all operations would be carried out by the British Mission with control being exercised from London. The American S.O. would have the right to send out a Liaison Mission to be attached to the British Mission for liaison purposes, but not for operational purposes.

India 11, 252.
• OSS
• Organization
• CES - 194
• SOE

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BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 51

267-1
(C.C.S. 196)

Apr. 16, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.S.S. ORGANIZATION IN INDIA

Note by the Representatives of the
British Chiefs of Staff

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1943.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO BRIGADIER GENERAL
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN:

Subject: O.S.S. Organization in
India.

Reference: (a) C.C.S. 195.

Enclosure: Copy of Reference (a).

The enclosed paper has been placed on the agenda for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting on Tuesday afternoon. In order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff may have the benefit of your opinion regarding this paper, will you please send your comments to me by 10:00 A.M. on Tuesday, April 13.

Royal
ROYAL

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into Burma, the establishment of a separate American secret intelligence service operating initially from India into Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China will be necessary, and the proposed agreement should be modified to that extent.

For the Planning Group:

James Grafton Rogers
James Grafton Rogers ¹²

Chairman

cc: Dr. Rogers
P.G. Files

SECRET

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES****INTEROFFICE MEMO****FROM: OSS Planning Group****DATE: April 12, 1945****TO: Brig. General William J. Donovan****SUBJECT: OSS Organization in India
Reference: C.C.S. 196**

1. In compliance with your request for comments on C.C.S. 196, "OSS Organization in India", attention is invited to the fact that the agreements referred to in Par. 3 of the paper pertain to S.O. and S.O. E. only. No agreement known to us limits secret intelligence operations anywhere.

2. With reference to the agreement as to Burma, the summary approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 August 1942 (JCS 86/1) assigns Burma as a sphere of joint British-American operations, or as recorded by the Record of Discussion of this Agreement, dated 17 June 1942:

"It was agreed that Burma and Sumatra should be regarded as a no-man's land which would be worked into as convenient by the British S.O.E. mission in India, the American S.O. mission in China, and the I.S.D. in Australia".

We find no record of the text cited in paragraph 3, dated "September 1942" covering Burma.

3. We concur in the establishment of an OSS liaison mission as recommended by Mr. Phillips, but do not believe that this mission should be under Colonel Osman who heads the G-2 observer group. It is believed that his mission should be an independent liaison group linking OSS in Washington with New Delhi, and New Delhi with General Stilwell's headquarters. Its main purpose is to assist in the coordination with the British and the administration of all OSS activities in Burma and China, and insure the interchange of information with the British.

4. With respect to control and coordination of Colonel Eicher's group, it is believed that as long as he conducts operations from India, the request made by the British is justified.

5. If there is to be a joint military operation

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command in event of emergency.

It is our understanding that the representative of SOE agreed with the point of view above expressed and it has been the earnest hope of the SO Branch of OSS that this principle, which was subsequently confirmed by the Head of SOE in London, would be extended to other areas.

4. It is presumed that the intent and purpose of the suggestions of the British Chiefs of Staff with respect to the operations of Colonel Eifler's groups conform to the principles of collaboration which have been outlined above and we, therefore, see no reason why the note should not be accepted without reservation.



Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, AUS
Chief, SO Branch

SECRET

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only those avenues of contact and approach which are open to SOE. This means that the field of endeavor of both organizations will be distinctly narrowed. It would seriously affect not only operations but recruiting, and all of the other relationships which must be maintained and established, if proper operational coverage is desired.

4. It is our belief that those in charge of the affairs of SOE agree with us on the principle of collaboration as opposed to that of domination. This principle was established in conversations had on March 5th, 1943, between representatives of OSS and SOE in London. It was also clearly established in further conversations between representatives of the two organizations had in North Africa on February 20th last. In connection with these latter conversations SOE specifically raised the question of whether or not it might eventually establish and maintain an independent organization on territory theretofore considered as "an American sphere of influence", from which territory it was proposed SOE should operate into areas likewise considered within the American sphere. It was stated by the representatives of OSS on this occasion that it was their belief that the interests of both organizations could best be served by the maintenance of independent operational units, upon the understanding that matters of general policy would be cleared by those in command; and that the effectiveness of both SOE and OSS would be increased, if each was able to establish and maintain, within enemy territory, active and independent organizations, all of which could be made available to the Allied

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-2-

in meeting the requirements of the British Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to keeping the Joint Intelligence Committee informed.

2. With respect to the position of Colonel Eifler's group you are advised:

a. Colonel Eifler is attached to and operating under the command of General Stilwell and the question of the control and coordination of his operations by General Wavell is one which must, in the final analysis, be referred by this office to General Stilwell.

b. While, under the memorandum between SOE and OSS (referred to in the Note), it would seem that both SOE and OSS were to operate freely within Burma, nevertheless, since Colonel Eifler's operations are based on India, there is no basis for an objection on the part of OSS to "general control and coordination" by SOE, India.

3. In connection with the last mentioned point, it has always been the belief of the SO Branch of OSS that it should have in all Theatres the closest possible collaboration with SOE. It has equally been our conviction, however, that this collaboration should not involve any loss of independence on the part of OSS with respect to its operations. Such a result, we have felt, would greatly limit the usefulness of both SOE and OSS and would be a disservice to the war effort generally. If "coordination" is to be construed as "domination" then OSS will become simply an adjunct of SOE and there will be open to it

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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

April 12, 1943

FROM: COLONEL ELLERY C. HUNTINGTON, JR.

**SUBJECT: OSS ORGANIZATION - INDIA - MEMORANDUM OF COMBINED
CHIEFS OF STAFF, APRIL 11th, 1943.**

**TO: BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN, DIRECTOR OF
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.**

1. In connection with the note by the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, dated April 8th, 1943, relating to the above subject:

a. It is understandable that the British Chiefs of Staff should wish to insure that there be no overlapping of activities in India and that for this reason the Joint Intelligence Committee (India) should be kept fully informed with respect to material dispatched to Washington by the proposed liaison mission of OSS.

b. In accomplishing this end it is suggested that "the new OSS Mission should be aligned with the Observer Group under Colonel Osborne". Whether or not this is practical from an operational and administrative point of view can only be determined, of course, when the details of the mission have been evolved.

c. There should not, in any event, be any difficulty

that we aid him in obtaining the services of certain American Japanese to be sent under Lieutenant [redacted] [redacted] supervision from the United States to New Delhi. He has asked also for the assistance of certain of our [redacted] staff in New Delhi. We believe that compliance with this request would mean that we would be of real assistance to the British in that area in research and the information obtained would be of great value to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Recommendation: That an OSS mission be established in India on the basis of complete collaboration with the appropriate British authorities.

William J. Donovan
Director

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should be regarded as a no-man's land which could be worked into as convenient by the British SOE mission in India, the American SO mission in China, and the ISD in Australia.*

4. There is no agreement which limits secret intelligence operations anywhere. On the contrary, it is our understanding with British SIS, with which our SI works on a basis of the fullest exchange of information, that it is in the best interests of both countries that these organizations should operate independently.

5. We carry on no intelligence operations in India and do not wish to do so. However, as I have already advised you, we are now working jointly with the Counter-Intelligence Branch of SIS. The suggestion has been made by British representatives here that they desire to have some of our representatives work with their counter-intelligence unit in India. We would be glad to cooperate in this respect.

6. We believe it undesirable that our mission in India should be linked with the Observer Group under Colonel Osmon. If approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff we would be glad to have Colonel Osmon assigned to us and we would put him in charge of our mission, but we think it a mistake to tie up the Observer Group with our mission.

7. Mr. P. D. Butler, who is head of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Ministry of Information in New Delhi and has charge of the work under the British Government in the field of political warfare in the Far East, has requested our aid in his New Delhi bureau. He is not directly concerned with India itself but with the Far East beyond India. He has requested the services of Second Lieutenant T.F.M. Adams of the 4th Fighter Command, Oakland, California, official number 3-915247. Lieutenant Adams was employed at the British Consulate General in San Francisco during the years 1940-1941 when Mr. Butler was serving as British Consul. He has suggested that we ask the assignment of Lieutenant Adams to the ONS and his reassignment on the part of this office to the British Far Eastern Bureau. He has requested further

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made, however, that where two parallel and independent U.S. and British sections already exist, British and U.S. personnel should be exchanged; that where parallel and independent sections do not exist inter-Allied sections should be formed by posting Americans to existing British sections and vice versa, these sections being regarded as working under the Combined Liaison Committee.

6. It is believed that if the instructions to General Stilwell could be extended to cover the points referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 above the American proposal will be both acceptable and workable.

7. In conclusion, we would like to assure all concerned that there is every desire on the part of the British to be completely co-operative in the sphere for which they are responsible. It is realized that arrangements regarding U.S.-British Intelligence activities will have to be co-ordinated with the needs of the new South-East Asian Command when it comes into being.

8. We should be glad to know whether the two reservations made by the Viceroy and the Commander in Chief, India, are acceptable to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. We feel that this Combined Liaison Committee has great possibilities and may well provide a really workable solution to the many difficulties that have been met in the past.

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2. The idea was that this Combined Liaison Committee, with British and American representation, should meet in New Delhi; that, in addition to Intelligence representatives, both air and ground, the U.S. representatives should include a "Rear Echelon" officer conversant with the American quasi military and civilian agencies (Board of Economic Warfare, Office of Strategic Services, Office of War Information, Federal Communications Commission, etc.).

3. This American proposal has been referred to India where it has been considered carefully by both the Viceroy and the Commander in Chief, India. They agree that the proposal forms a basis for reasonable compromise provided that in the future there will be a greater degree of frankness in respect of quasi military activities than has previously been shown by the U.S. Authorities concerned. They make two reservations which we hope that you will find acceptable.

4. They request that instructions should be issued that before any quasi military activities are undertaken by the U.S. authorities in or from India, there must be full and frank discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee and that before such plans are put into operation the concurrence of the Government of India and/or the Commander in Chief, India, must be obtained. The U.S. would, of course, be fully informed of British plans and activities and would be entitled to discuss them.

This reservation has been made because in the past the practice has been for the local U.S. Authorities concerned with quasi military activities to present the British with a fait accompli whenever possible or, alternatively, to approach several local civil or military authorities for assistance without ever disclosing full intentions or the scope of the proposed activities to any of them.

5. The second reservation is in connection with the combining of resources in regard to combat intelligence. The present co-operation regarding the exchange of combat intelligence is relatively much more satisfactory and some slight progress has been made in the direction of combining resources. A specific request is now

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C.C.S. 1. '2

9 August 1944

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. ORGANIZATION IN INDIA

INTELLIGENCE AND QUASI INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN INDIA

Memorandum by the Representatives of the
British Chiefs of Staff

1. You will remember that at the end of the TRIDENT Conference attention was drawn to the necessity for co-ordination of U.S. and British Intelligence activities in or from India. The British proposals which had been in effect designed to secure an integration of U.S.-British Intelligence activities in every field in or from India did not meet the case from the U.S. point of view and an alternative proposal was put forward that a Combined Liaison Committee should be established. The American proposal was that this Committee should be established with the following purposes:-

- a. To facilitate combat intelligence, both air and ground, being exchanged between G.H.Q. and Rear Echelon in New Delhi.
- b. To enable co-operation to be facilitated between the American Joint Intelligence Collection Agency now being organized in the theater, and the British Joint Intelligence Committee.
- c. To have referred to it as an additional function, and to go into, problems arising with respect to U.S. and British quasi military and civil organizations (Office of Strategic Services, Board of Economic Warfare, Federal Communications Commission, Office of War Information, etc.) and also to suggest to commanders on the ground solutions to these problems.
- d. To constitute a central point through which the exchange of information from all these groups can be channelized, co-ordination arranged, and points of divergence ironed out.

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COPY NO. 68

267-7
(C.O.S. 196/2)

9 August 1943

267
 (1) C.O.S. 196
 (2) J.O.S. 261
 (3) J.P.S. 161/p
 (4) J.P.S. 161/1
 (5) J.O.S. 261/1
 (6) C.O.S. 196/1

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

O.S.S. ORGANIZATION IN INDIA

INTELLIGENCE AND QUASI INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN INDIA

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Keywords: child sexual abuse; disclosure; legal system

Keywords: child sexual abuse; disclosure; social support

Abstract

Abstract

Table 1

(9349)

Asiatic theatre retain their identity as purely American organizations. Such an arrangement is not without benefit to the British, for they stand to profit materially from the good reputation which independent American organizations enjoy with the Asiatics.

General Canthorpe's proposal that American and British reports to Washington and London be submitted to an Anglo-American committee strikes me as somewhat excessive. It is clear that his principal concern in this connection was with reports on internal conditions in India and Ceylon. When British agencies in Washington are prepared to submit to a joint Anglo-American board their estimates of the American domestic scene and their recommendations regarding British policy toward the United States, a British interpretation of our reports from India should be subjected to joint scrutiny will have some force.

All of the foregoing is not meant to convey the impression that I am opposed to collaboration with the British. I am in favor of the closest cooperation and interchange of information at New Delhi. But I do feel that politically we would stand to lose heavily in any pooling of personnel and amalgamation of agencies.

I am not sure how far General Canthorpe's proposals contemplate the inclusion of our information and agencies in Chungking. The Generalissimo and his military and civil officials might be expected to be highly suspicious of any Anglo-American amalgamation. If the Chinese believed that all of our reports from Chungking were going to the British at New Delhi, we would have to be prepared for a partial drying-up of our present limited sources of information in China and our present plans for expansion and coordination of intelligence in China would be seriously handicapped.

Finally, it is perhaps scarcely necessary to note that the amalgamation of certain American civil agencies abroad with their British counterparts would involve an unprecedented departure in American foreign policy and as such should have the concurrence not only of the agencies concerned but also of the Department of State.

John Davies, Jr.
Second Secretary of Embassy
attached to General Stilwell

May 31, 1945.

SUBJECT: Comments on Proposal Submitted by
Major General Cantherby on May 25, 1945.

General Cantherby's proposals for a joint intelligence set-up at New Delhi and the pooling of American and British civil agencies in India engaged in the collection of intelligence and in psychological warfare was made, so far as I know, without reference to General Stilwell. The proposals were not presented until after General Stilwell's departure from Washington.

I should like to comment here on General Cantherby's proposals as I recall they were originally made.

In so far as the collection of straight military intelligence is concerned, General Cantherby's suggestions would seem to have considerable merit. However, he seemed to be as much concerned, if not more concerned, with psychological (including political) warfare and American reporting on internal Indian conditions as he was with the collection of military intelligence.

In the field of psychological warfare, American and British interests are by no means identical. The British are fighting primarily for the retention, or not retention, of their Empire. We are fighting without Imperialistic designs solely for the defeat of Japan. To tie our psychological warfare program to that of the British would be to identify ourselves in the eyes of the Burmese and all of the colonial Asiatics with British imperialism. If we do this we may as well abandon psychological warfare in Asia.

It is true that so long as we are operating from India as a base we must take into consideration British feeling with regard to propaganda emanating from that area. The British quite naturally think only in terms of their own Imperial problems. They do not realize that we, for our part, are embarrassed by their attitude toward the Asiatics. That because the Burmese and other colonials identify us with the British, our operations through Burma, for example, will be met with resistance and sabotage which we would not encounter were we operating independently. It therefore seems to me most important that G-2 and G-3 in the

Asiatic

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Dec 2, 1941

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**MINUTE OF CONFERENCE HELD IN WASHINGTON AT A. C. ST. P. 1941
ON SATURDAY, 22ND OF NOV. 1941**

General Carthagen stated: "With reference to para 4 of the record of the Conference, I would like to have it recorded that I observed that the Government of India would naturally reserve the right to ask for modification of the arrangements set out in the modified proposal (F) should these not prove satisfactory from their point of view after experience of their working."

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6. In regard to Proposal (2), it was thought that this might be included as the subject matter was considered adequately covered by the provisions of Proposal (3) as amended.
6. In regard to (2), it was felt that this might well be applied because in essence its provisions can be applied to the degree deemed necessary under the terms of Proposal (3).
7. General Strong closed the meeting with the statement that prior to any further action being taken on the Proposals, he would recommend that the Proposals and Amendments be copied General Stilwell for his comment and recommendations; that upon receipt of General Stilwell's reply, the matter should be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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4. Consideration was then given to paragraph 3, Annex B. It appeared to be the consensus of opinion of those present, speaking as those of their own authority and not binding upon their principals, that proposals (a), (b), (c) and (d) could be accepted in principle with the reservation that final approval could be given only after full consideration of the detailed provisions adopted to effectuate the proposals concerned.

In connection with Proposal (d) it was suggested that the last four lines be amended to read as follows:

"... to be fully coordinated by the J.I.C., referred to in (a) above, and each section include a proportion of members of both nationalities."

In regard to Proposal (f), it appeared to be the consensus of opinion that it should be amended to read as follows:

"As an immediate step, civil organizations of the nature of S.G.E., S.I.S., P.N.E., M.E.W., O.S.S., O.N.I., P.G.C., and E.M.W., working in and from India to be fully coordinated by the J.I.C. referred to in paragraph (a) above."

It should be noted, however, that representatives of the O.S.S. and O.N.I. were inclined to question the practicability even of the amended paragraph on the grounds that they preferred to remain separate and distinct agencies, subject to no control except by the Theater Commander in person.

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Summary of Conference held in Office of A.C. of S. on Saturday, 29th of May, to discuss British Proposals on the Coordination and Integration of Anglo-American Intelligence and Quasi-Intelligence Organizations and Activities in India and India-China-Burma Commands on the Basis of the Present Political and Military Aspect of the Area.

1. Meeting met at 10:30 A.M.

Present:

Major General Geo. V. Strong, G-2
 Major General Cawthorn, S.M.I., India Command
 Brig. General John Magruder, OSS
 Brig. General J. E. Deane, JG-5
 Mr. John Davies, Political Advisor to Gen. Stilwell
 Brigadier Bedman, BAS
 Lt. Col. P. G. Pennoyer, OFP
 Mr. Shephardson, OSS
 Mr. P. Shar, RSW
 Lt. T. J. Hamilton, ONI
 Mr. Robert D. Leigh, FOG

2. General Strong read a letter of May 27, 1943, addressed to General McEwney, on the subject of Combined U.S.-British Intelligence Activity in India, in which was enclosed copy of a Memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, dated 21st of May 1943, and submitted by Field Marshal Wavell, C. in C. of the India Command, along with Annexes A and B thereto.
3. General Cawthorn gave a brief exposition of conditions in India, Burma and China. He brought out in some detail certain points indicating that the present situation was unsatisfactory. He pointed out quite clearly that the situation is special in character and, in some respects, differs markedly from conditions encountered in other areas. Various members present questioned General Cawthorn on certain items that he mentioned.

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Copy for General Magruder

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(b) A Joint Anglo-U.S.A. J.I.C. to be set up in London consisting of British and American officers to coordinate intelligence requirements, covering the military, economic, political and civil intelligence aspects.

(c) This J.I.C. to be responsible jointly to the British and American Chiefs of Staff for the provision of intelligence, and for the conduct of service intelligence organizations and the coordination with Service interests of the collection of the various civil intelligence requirements. Also to be responsible for providing intelligence on the Asiatic theatre to the Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington through the respective J.I.C.s.

(d) The central intelligence sections of the British and American intelligence staffs to continue to be present as separate entities but each to include a proportion of officers of both nationalities.

(e) All other intelligence sections, e.g., those dealing with:

- (i) Security, including censorship
- (ii) Reception
- (iii) T intelligence
- (iv) Navy and air, e.g., P.C.I., from the intelligence aspect
- (v) Technical intelligence
- (vi) Economic intelligence
- (vii) Field propaganda

to be fully integrated as Allied sections, headed either by a British or American officer, the whole forming an inter-allied intelligence organization controlled by the J.I.C. referred to in (a) above.

(f) Intelligence units and organizations such as S.A.S.I.C., T-centres, Translation Bureau and, where desirable, Field Security Sections, to be staffed by both British and American personnel, i.e., resources to be pooled, but each to have one commander or Head who may be of either nationality.

(g) Civil organizations of the nature of S.O.S., S.I.S., F.N.R., M.R.W., O.S.S., O.M.I., P.C.C., and R.R.R., working in and from India to be similarly organized by pooling British and American personnel and resources under one Head in each case who may be either British or American.

(h) The J.I.C. referred to in (a) above to be responsible to the two theatre Commanders for coordinating, from the intelligence aspect, with service plans and activities, the work of the various civil organizations mentioned in (f).

(i) Major reports of an intelligence nature on the Asiatic theatre from the organizations mentioned in (f) to be coordinated by the J.I.C. before dispatch to London and Washington.

REPORT OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE
OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN INDIA
CONSIDERATION AND ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA OF
RESEARCH, CHIEFS OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1944

CONSIDERATIONS

1. It is necessary to bear in mind

- (a) India and China are both being used as bases for British and American intelligence activities. The fields in which they operate being one and indivisible from the intelligence aspect - i.e., it is not possible to divide the theatre into American and British intelligence spheres.
- (b) There is no British or American civil or political authority whose sphere coincides with that of the British and American theatre commanders.
- (c) On the American side, the theatre commander controls all quasi intelligence activities of civilian organizations corresponding to the British S.I.C., S.O.M., P.W.M., M. of I. and M.M.W. On the British side these are not all subject to the control of the theatre commander while, in addition to these M.M.W. organizations, there are also departments of the Government of India carrying out similar work in part of the theatre.
- (d) The Americans have a main H.Q. in Chungking with a rear H.Q. in Delhi, and the American theatre commander has a dual role, inasmuch as he is also Chief of Staff to the Chinese Government.
- (e) The Government of India have been asked by the President's Personal Representative to agree to the establishment in India of various American intelligence organizations. It is understood that the Government of India will not be disposed to accept this agreement even on the basis, now proposed by the American Chiefs of Staff, of these organizations being under the American theatre commander, without machinery existing for coordination and checking the results of these activities from the political aspect.
- (f) Realization of any scheme for the integration of intelligence and quasi intelligence activities in the Asiatic theatre depends firstly on a settlement on the British side of the machinery for the local control of Political Warfare and Propaganda activities in the Far East, and then on the issue of directions to the American Theatre Commander, setting forth the general policy desired and directing him to appoint representatives to discuss detailed proposals.

SECRET

SECRET

**RECOMMENDATION FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
IN THE ASIAN THEATRE**

1. In U.S.S. 104/1 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have informed the British Chiefs of Staff that the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, India - China - Burma, proposes to establish a joint intelligence centre in the Asiatic theatre.

The British Chiefs of Staff, however, feel that the most satisfactory solution will only be achieved by the integration of the various British and American organizations involved. They consider therefore, that before the U.S. Joint Intelligence Centre in the Asiatic theatre can be set up in Delhi, representatives of the U.S. Commanding General and the British C. in C. in India should put forward a plan for the integration of all British and American Intelligence and quasi-Intelligence activities in India and Indo-China - Burma commands. This would result in the respective theatre commanders and the Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington receiving the same intelligence picture, which will be fully co-ordinated and based on all possible sources. This is not the case at present. It will also ensure that the functions of the various organizations such as the British S.O.M., S.I.S. and P.W.E. and the American C.I.A. are fully co-ordinated and that their activities do not conflict with operational plans.

SECRETARY,

CHIEF OF STAFF, AMERICAN.

U.S. MILITARY COMMANDERS' REQUEST FOR A PLAN

1. With reference to paragraph 2 of the memorandum of the Chief of Staff (U.S.) regarding the proposed American plan to submit a draft of a memorandum which I suggest should be submitted to the American Chiefs of Staff by the British Chiefs of Staff.
2. I also attach to Annex B, for the information of the British Chiefs of Staff, a summary of the intelligence report which I consider we should aim at producing, whether or not a Supreme Allied Commander is appointed.

F. H.
G. in C. Extra Command.

Washington, D.C.
1st May, 1943.

It is very desirable to make sure that everything will be done in a basis acceptable to the Government of India which, under the Plan, is to all intents and purposes an autonomous government. I am therefore writing this letter to ask you if you would be prepared to arrange for a meeting under an authoritative chairman of your choosing, of the representatives of the American organizations concerned (A.M.I., A.S.S., P.O.S., E.E.C.) together with a representative of your C.I.I. and possibly General Stilwell's political adviser, at which General Goodrich could put the Government of India's viewpoint and Field Marshal Mountbatten's proposals.

General Goodrich is due to leave Washington on Sunday night but could defer his departure for a day or two for such a meeting. He has to be in London by the morning of 5th June.

Yours very sincerely,

/s/ J. G. DILL

would not cover other issues raised by the Government of India with regard to the setting up in India of branches of such organizations as C.S.B., C.S.I., etc.

At the request, therefore, of the British Chiefs of Staff, Field Marshal Wavell, in his double capacity of Commander-in-Chief, India Command, and representative of the Government of India, has put forward proposals for a general solution to this problem covering British, Indian and United States interests. I enclose a copy of these proposals. From them, you will see that he considers, and with this the British Chiefs of Staff agree, that the most satisfactory solution can only be achieved by the integration of the various British and American organizations involved.

Major General Cawthorn, D.M.I., India Command, who is fully acquainted with the issues involved and is authorized to represent the Government of India's views, is still in Washington. I am anxious that his special knowledge on the subject shall be put to best advantage before he leaves towards the settlement of this somewhat complex problem. He has had discussions individually with all the American interests involved excepting with the Staff of General Stilwell, and he is satisfied that the principle of combined intelligence activity on the lines set out in Field Marshal Wavell's note (attached) will be generally acceptable. He has also found no U.S. authority to collate and finalize these tentative agreements. He finds, moreover, that active preparations are on foot by some of the civilian organizations concerned to designate representatives to India. I am sure you will agree that

SECRET
SECRET**COMBINED U. S. - BRITISH INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITY IN INDIA.**

Dear McHarney

The need for close co-ordination of U.S.-British intelligence activity in India has become increasingly evident of late and it was hoped that the whole question might have been cleared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Field Marshal Wavell and General Stilwell during the recent Bridge Conference. Unfortunately, pressure of other work prevented this and the matter has been left unsettled.

You will remember that in C.C.S. 196/1, in replying to a British note on the subject of the establishment in India of a small branch of the C.S.S. organization, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff indicated that they proposed to establish a joint intelligence centre in New Delhi. While this proposal would be a great step forward as regards co-operation in purely military intelligence between the two Theatre Commanders, it

Lt. General J. T. McHarney,
Room 4E, JED-16,
Pentagon Building

[COPY]

TRUE READING OF CODE TELEGRAM RECEIVED.

Karachi, May 1 8 PM

MOST IMMEDIATE AMERICAN CONSUL KARACHI

41 MAY 1 6 PM FROM MERRELL FOR AMBASSADOR PHILLIPS.

AS A RESULT OF MY VISIT TO LAITHWAITE YESTERDAY HE
HAS JUST SENT ME A NOTE MARKED SECRET OF WHICH THE
FOLLOWING IS A CLOSE PARAPHRASE:

"THE VICEROY HAS GIVEN FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO THE
ARRANGEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH O.S.S. etc., WHICH HE
DISCUSSED WITH MR. PHILLIPS DURING LATTER'S RECENT VISIT
TO DEHRA. THE VICEROY REGRETS THAT HE IS NOT ABLE TO LET
HIM HAVE A FINAL REPLY REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
O.S.S. SECTION TO BE ATTACHED TO MR. PHILLIPS' MISSION
BEFORE THE AMBASSADOR'S DEPARTURE FOR THE UNITED STATES
BUT HE IS TAKING ALL POSSIBLE STEPS TO EXPEDITE REPLY.

"2. THE PROPOSAL WHICH THE AMBASSADOR HAS MADE TO
HIM FOR CERTAIN RADIO MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS, AGAIN WILL,
IT APPEARS, REQUIRE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND THE VICEROY
REGRETS NOT TO BE ABLE TO LET HIM HAVE A FINAL REPLY IN
REGARD THERETO.

"3. REGARDING THE ATTACHMENT OF A RESEARCH OFFICER
TO THE FAR EASTERN BUREAU ON WHICH SUBJECT MR. PHILLIPS
GAVE THE VICEROY A MEMORANDUM, HIS EXCELLENCY IS GLAD TO
AGREE TO THE ATTACHMENT OF A RESEARCH OFFICER SUBJECT TO
THE UNDERTAKING THAT ANY REPORTS HE SENDS BACK TO O.S.S.
WILL BE SHOWN BEFORE SENDING TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF
THAT BUREAU. THE VICEROY FEELS CERTAIN IN THIS CONNECTION
THAT THE AMBASSADOR WILL REALIZE THAT THIS HAS A DIRECT
RELEVANCE TO HIS OTHER PROPOSAL REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH
ONE ABOVE, TO WHICH HE IS SO SORRY NOT YET TO BE ABLE TO
GIVE THE AMBASSADOR DEFINITIVE ANSWER.

"4. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU WILL INFORM THE
AMBASSADOR OF THE POSITION BEFORE HE LEAVES INDIA ON
SUNDAY MORNING."

I SHALL ENDEAVOR TO OBTAIN REPLIES TO UNANSWERED
BEFORE YOUR ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON.

MERRELL.

AMERICAN OFFICIAL, COMMUNIST IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1943

Dear General:

Up until the last moment before my departure from India I was pressing the Viceroy for an answer to your requests with regard to the establishment of a liaison connection with the S.O.E. and S.I. in Delhi as well as for the establishment of certain radio monitoring arrangements. The enclosed reply was received from the Viceroy through the American Consul at Karachi just as I was boarding the plane for return to Washington. You will note that he is still considering the first two points but that he has given approval to the attachment of a research officer to the Far Eastern Bureau in Delhi.

Sincerely yours,

William Phillips

Enclosure:

From Karachi, May 1.

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,

Office of Strategic Services,

Twenty-fifth and E, Northwest,

Washington, D. C.



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

India 11.252 B
Leahy, Adm 45th H
X British Chiefs of Staff
X J.C.S.

5 June 1943.

SECRET

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Director of Strategic Services,
25th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

The British Chiefs of Staff have submitted certain proposals to the United States Chiefs of Staff regarding intelligence, propaganda, and OSS activities in and from India. In effect these proposals, if accepted, would combine the American and British agencies engaged in these activities. Brigadier General Magruder and Mr. Shepardson from your office were present in General Strong's office when these proposals were discussed.

General Stilwell has had the proposals submitted to him for comment and when his reply is received the matter will be thoroughly considered by the United States Chiefs of Staff and by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A decision in the matter should be reached in the very near future. Pending this decision, however, the United States Chiefs of Staff feel it advisable that you suspend action in sending any additional personnel to India unless they have already received specific prior approval from the British authorities in India.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William Leahy
WILLIAM D. LEAHY,

Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.



SECRET

11 June 1943

Admiral William D. Leahy
Chief of Staff to the Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Leahy:

I have your letter of 5 June 1943 requesting that I discontinue sending personnel to India until the Combined Chiefs of Staff reach a decision on certain proposals by the British regarding intelligence, propaganda and OSS activities in and from India. It is understood that I may dispatch any personnel which had the specific prior approval of the British authorities in India.

I plan, however, to send one Officer to Chungking to make an inspection of our establishment. I would like to have this Officer make one or two stops in India enroute. Since India is merely a stop on his itinerary and since he will only make an inspection and return to the United States, I assume that the foregoing prohibition will not apply.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

WHD:CL:DMB

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

India (OSS) 11,202 B-
1 Leahy-
1 JCS-
1 Br Chief of Staff

14 June 1943.

SECRET

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Director of Strategic Services,
25th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Admiral Leahy asked me to acknowledge
your note of 11 June 1943 with reference to send-
ing personnel to India.

There will be no objection to your
sending an officer to Chungking or to his making
one or two stops in India in order to inspect
the installations you now have in that country.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

John R. Deane
JOHN R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Secretary.



SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: *Gen. Donovan*
~~Dr. James G. Rogers~~

FROM: Brig. Gen. B. F. Fellers, USA

SUBJECT: Attached document

DATE: 15 June 1948

Reference is made to the attached file on Joint-Anglo-American Psychological Warfare Activities in India.

1. My experience in Cairo was that the British were determined that my reports should present the same intelligence picture in Washington that British reports presented. There is inherent and grave danger in any attempt by American and British representatives to present the same intelligence picture. Although Great Britain and America have a common objective in the war, our interests, especially in the Far East, are widely divergent.
2. Under no circumstance should our Strategic Services operations be identified with those of the British. Justly or not, the British are bitterly disliked by the Orientals. To identify our agencies with those of the British simply means we shall immediately inherit all the antipathy which the Oriental holds for the British. We might just as well not have agencies in the field as to attempt to unify our observations with those of the British.
3. It is natural for the British to take the stand that internal conditions in India are none of our affair. On the other hand, we have underwritten this war and any widespread disturbance in India might cost hundreds of thousands of American lives. Consequently, India becomes of immediate concern to the United States, and it is vital to our interests that this Indian problem be understood.

B. F. F.

Attachment


Advice to the effect that before arrival of [redacted] [redacted]
 arrangements were made with [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
 S. Subsequently S & H indicated that during their conversation
 with [redacted] and other effort was made by [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
 H. was to have told [redacted] he would do anything he could to
 assist that group in order to please [redacted]. [redacted] [redacted]
 conference [redacted] appeared interested or anxious to [redacted] [redacted]
 control of group and were perturbed because group is not fully
 equipped for full scale operations prior to departure from [redacted].
 Stillwell agreed to hold that decision in abeyance pending return of
 Thai letter because of telegram from Thai letter to [redacted] which stated
 that [redacted] could not agree to turn in Thai group to [redacted] since this
 is an approved function of [redacted].



SECRET

- 2 -

distinguish between General Stilwell's cooperation with us under normal circumstances and his attempt to cooperate with us under these very trying circumstances. We have the implied obligation of protecting his flank.


CARL O. HOFFMAN
Captain, AEC

COH:enk

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OSS India(OSS) 11/25/45

Adm. Leahy
Br. Chiefs of Staff
J.E.S.

SECRET

20 July 1945

Shaw C. Ben Donovan in his return

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Colonel Buxton

FROM: Captain C. O. Hoffmann

SUBJECT: Conference with Admiral Leahy at the White House.
Present: Admiral Leahy, Colonel Buxton, Captain Hoffmann

1. Colonel Buxton and Captain Hoffmann went to Admiral Leahy's office by appointment at 11:30 this morning. The Admiral was delayed with the President for a half hour, and saw Colonel Buxton and Captain Hoffmann at 12:00.

2. Colonel Buxton opened the conversation by stating that there were certain matters respecting the Admiral's recent "stop order" to India of which Colonel Buxton felt the Admiral should be advised. Colonel Buxton explained that Kifler, who operates under General Stilwell, is in need of personnel which has been approved by the General. Admiral Leahy advised Colonel Buxton that if General Stilwell wants these men to go to Kifler, we should send them. He observed that we have to support General Stilwell, and that if no one makes a point of it, it would have to be argued out at such time.

3. Colonel Buxton then advised Admiral Leahy that we received certain cables requesting other personnel to be stationed at New Delhi and that we were in an embarrassing situation since we have, on the one hand, the Admiral's "stop order" and, on the other hand, a request on behalf of the General. The Admiral observed that "we" were trying to develop a campaign in Burma, and that "we" and General Stilwell needed cooperation; that no one knows General Stilwell's situation with the British better than he himself; and that, if he feels he needs the personnel badly enough to make an issue of it with the British, Admiral Leahy would be happy to take the matter up with the JCS, but would not attempt to predict their action.

Further's note: It appears obvious from the foregoing that if General Stilwell has no serious need for the personnel in question and we insist on shipping them with the result that he had a clash with the British, he would soon get the feeling that the difficulties he encounters in dealing with JCS are not worth the benefits he gets in the relationship. He must therefore apparently take care that we

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

OCJ 196/2

12 August 1961

FROM: Admiral Purnell

TO: Admiral Hing

1. The quoted proposal is error in charging OCS with counterintelligence.
2. OCS cannot accomplish its functions if charged to discuss its plans with the Government of India and the Government of China, India police activity. This applies to operations from India, and to espionage and counter espionage activities in India.
3. General Donovan maintains that OCS is still charged with espionage and counter espionage and that these duties cannot be accomplished if these responsibilities are restricted in regard to where they work. In light of a similar restrictive attempt in North Africa, he took the stand that every sovereign nation has the right to unrestricted operation of these activities with complete secrecy, and was upheld by the Theater Commander.
4. There is a possibility that this paper is an entering wedge towards a similar deal in China, which would dry up our sources of information and wreck our effort there.
5. I recommend that before OCJ 196/2 is acted upon it be referred to General Donovan for comment.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 12, 1943

Incl (os) 252
OSR
Organization
x T. C. S. 261/1
C. C. S. 196
x S. O. E.

TO: General Donovan ✓
 General Magruder
 Major Deering
 Mr. Shepherdson
 Mr. Murphy
 Mr. Scribner
 Captain Hoffman

FROM: R. Davis Halliwell

SUBJECT: OCS Document 196/2 -- Comments

On August 11, Captain J. C. Metzel, USN brought to General Donovan a copy of the OCS Document known as 196/2, which in essence was a proposal for a certain type of correlation of activities in India, which had somewhat the flavor of the Gwathorne proposal.

It is not known to the writer whether a copy of this OCS document is available to this office, but the attached comments from Admiral Farnell to Admiral King under date of August 12th, 1943, is of possible interest to you.

This is for your information and files.

[Signature]
 R. Davis Halliwell
 Lt. Commander, USN
 Chief, SO

Attachment
ENCLOSURE

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN A. DEASE

1. You will recall that a question arose as to the sending of needed personnel to Lt. Col. Lajthay, the GSB officer on the staff of General Stilwell.
2. Colonel Buxton and Captain Hoffman saw Admiral Leahy, who indicated that he would recommend approval to JCS.
3. On 21 August 1943 a cable from Col. Farris to the War Department stated that this request was approved from General Stilwell.
4. Accordingly, I would greatly appreciate if authority could be granted to send these men as requested.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

11 September 1943

Brigadier General A. C. Wedemeyer
Room 3-F-784, Pentagon Building
Arlington, Virginia

Dear General Wedemeyer:

There is attached an original and
one copy of Aide-Memoir concerning OSS - India.
This is the material which you requested.

Sincerely,

G. Edward Huxton
Acting Director

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

India (OSS) 11.2.43 B-
x J.E.S.
x Leach
x Br. Ch. Staff

15 September 1943.

SECRET

Brigadier General Wm. J. Donovan,
Director, Strategic Services,
25th and E Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.


Dear General Donovan:

On 5 June 1943 you were advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to suspend action in sending additional personnel to India pending decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on certain proposals regarding intelligence, propaganda, and O.S.S. activities in and from India.

Since this question has been resolved, the restrictions imposed by the letter of 5 June are hereby removed.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:


JOHN R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Secretary.



SECRET

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

3. To facilitate the free exchange of information and coordination between the U.S. and British quasi-military agencies in INDIA and the South East Asia Command.

There will be full and open discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee before any quasi-military activities involving operations in INDIA or the South East Asia Theater are undertaken. However, before plans for such operations in these areas are put into effect by U.S. agencies, the concurrence of the Government of INDIA, the Commander in Chief, India, or the Supreme Commander, South East Asia Theater, must be obtained as applicable. The U.S. authorities are to be kept fully informed of British plans and activities, and will be entitled to discuss them.

4. To constitute a central point through which the exchange of information from all these groups can be channelized, coordination arranged, and points of divergence ironed out.

It is also agreed that there will be a free interchange of intelligence on a cooperative basis. However, the intermixture of British and American intelligence staff officers is not agreed to, except those operating on a combined staff under a supreme commander. Arrangements regarding U.S.-British Intelligence activities will have to be coordinated with the needs of the new South East Asia Command.

H. REDMAN,

J. R. DEANE,

Combined Secretariat.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 65

C.C.S. 196/4

4 September 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

INTELLIGENCE AND QUASI-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN INDIA

Reference: C.C.S. 117th Meeting, Item 7

Note by the Secretaries

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the formation of a Combined Liaison Committee in India with British and American representation. In addition to intelligence representatives, both air and ground, the U.S. representatives will include a "Rear Echelon" officer conversant with the American quasi-military and civilian activities (Office of Economic Warfare, Office of Strategic Services, Office of War Information, Federal Communications Commission, etc.).

The meetings of the committee will be at times and places which the committee finds requisite in order to enable information and views to be exchanged and problems referred to the committee to be discussed.

The committee will have the following purposes:

1. To facilitate combat intelligence, both air and ground, being exchanged between G.H.Q. and Rear Echelon in New Delhi.
2. To enable cooperation to be facilitated between the American Joint Intelligence Collection Agency now being organized in the theater, and the British Joint Intelligence Committee.

Index 112522
A.C.S. 176/4
Intelligence

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 65

267-10
(C.C.S. 196/4)

4 September 1943

- 267
- (1) C.O.S. 196
 - (2) J.O.S. 261
 - (3) J.P.S. 161/D
 - (4) J.P.S. 161/1
 - (5) J.O.S. 261/1
 - (6) C.O.S. 196/1
 - (7) C.O.S. 196/2
 - (8) J.O.S. 460
 - (9) C.O.S. 196/3

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

INTELLIGENCE AND QUASI-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN INDIA

Reference: C.C.S. 117th Meeting, Item 7

SECRET

ROUTING SHEET

INFORMATIONOriginator Combined Chiefs of Staff
Date 1 Sept. 1943Address Subject Intelligence and Quasi-Intelligence Activities in India - CopyDate Rec'd No. 65

To	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments Indicate action desired or taken
		Rec'd	For'd		
Col. Hurton					
Gen. Magruder (Col. Forgan)	121 Central				
Mr. Cheston	Admin.				
Dr. Rogers	Admin.				
Major Lincoln Mr. Scribner	2108 Q	10/13	10.13		
Col. Davis	—				
Major Hoffmann Mr. Shephardson	1212 Q				
Mr. Katz					

Lt. Dolan 213 Central
may. 1944
Gen. Donovan's Files - Admin.**PLEASE NOTE:****THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT MUST NOT BE
REPRODUCED IN ANY FASHION.**

*PR



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

21 October 1943

TO: Esigsn E. Putsell

FROM: Major Carl O. Hoffmann


SUBJECT: Cable concerning the Combined Liaison Committee

1. You will recall you gave me the subject cable to take over to Colonel Pennoyer for clearance.

2. Col. Pennoyer recommended that the cable be delayed until some discussions now pending in the War Department be concluded. This was reported to you.

3. Col. Pennoyer now advises that he recommends against sending the cable. He states that the cable is based on 508/3 and the Combined Chiefs have just released 196/4 which he believes will call for a change in the text of the cable.

4. When you have seen 196/4 which Colonel Pennoyer says is now on its way to OSS through regular channels and which I believe has already arrived, you will be in a better position to judge the type of cable to send.


CARL O. HOFFMANN
Major, AUS

SECRET

Meetings will be held at the residence of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., on the following dates:

1. The soldier will be present, shall be welcomed, and shall be given a tour of the facility.
2. The soldier will be given a tour of the facility, and shall be given a tour of the facility.
3. The soldier will be given a tour of the facility, and shall be given a tour of the facility.
4. The soldier will be given a tour of the facility, and shall be given a tour of the facility.
5. The soldier will be given a tour of the facility, and shall be given a tour of the facility.
6. The soldier will be given a tour of the facility, and shall be given a tour of the facility.
7. The soldier will be given a tour of the facility, and shall be given a tour of the facility.
8. The soldier will be given a tour of the facility, and shall be given a tour of the facility.
9. The soldier will be given a tour of the facility, and shall be given a tour of the facility.
10. The soldier will be given a tour of the facility, and shall be given a tour of the facility.

The agenda for any meeting will define the scope of the meeting, and shall be given to the soldier in advance of the meeting. The agenda for any meeting will define the scope of the meeting, and shall be given to the soldier in advance of the meeting.

Joint representation of the Committee shall be given by the soldier in advance of the meeting. Joint representation of the Committee shall be given by the soldier in advance of the meeting.

In the case of disagreement in the committee the matter shall be referred to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, for decision. In the case of disagreement in the committee the matter shall be referred to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, for decision.

B. G. FARRIS,
Brigadier General,
U. S. A.

1. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the situation in the Middle East and the role of the United States in the region. The meeting will be held in the following order:

a. That the meeting be held in the following order:

b. That the meeting be held in the following order:

c. That the meeting be held in the following order:

d. That the meeting be held in the following order:

2. Expected members and members of the delegation

a. The delegation to be made up of an equal number of British and American members.

b. American membership:

1-2 Mr. Nathan, Deputy Secy, USIA.
1-2 Mr. Nathan, Deputy Secy, USIA.
The number to be in the delegation.
Mr. John Davies representing USIA, USIA, USIA, and USIA.
Chatham, 1144

c. The above American members are to be British members. In addition to the voting members, there shall also be non-voting members who are to be designated by the British members and have the right to speak.

d. In the case that an equal number of British and American members are in attendance at any meeting, the number of voting members of the larger group shall be limited to the number of voting members of the smaller delegation.

e. Meetings may be called at the discretion of the smaller delegation of British voting members of the delegation.

f. The delegation calling the meetings shall provide a stenographer and furnish copies of the proceedings to both the American and British delegations.

For Captain D. C. [redacted] - November 20, 1963

SECRET

Throughout all of these negotiations Commander Taylor has been a tower of strength and his wise counsel has been invaluable.

X I will keep you advised of the developments in LRA as fast as they develop and will answer your other letter which Carl Hoffmann gave me in the next day or two.

Sincerely yours,

Richard P. Hoffman

Richard P. Hoffman
Lt. Colonel, P. A.
Strategic Services Officer
O H A

RPH/mat.

REAR ECHELON
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
CHINA BURMA INDIA

SECRET

1 Ferris
 A P O 885
 November 22, 1919
 1 Pouch 7

TO: CARPENTER, D. O., JR.
Generalist, O. S. S.
Administration Building
Room 5 E. State St.
Washington, D. C.

A circular black and white stamp. The outer ring contains the text "U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE" at the top and "OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL" at the bottom. In the center, the word "RECEIVED" is prominently displayed in a large, bold, sans-serif font. Below it, the date "9 DEC 1949" is stamped. Underneath the date, the words "SECRETARIAT" and "OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL" are printed in a smaller font. A small five-pointed star is positioned above the word "RECEIVED".

1. 1941-1942

I am now collecting the following information and enclosing to you with the report that you have it typed in whatever form is proper and convenient to all concerned.

X I am enclosing a copy of a communication from General Harbo to Lt. General de Terry Hammill on the subject of the Combined Liaison Group. This letter is provided for in the 1944. You will note that apart from this proposal that it will really be of little use to us because of the actual nature of its powers and functions. Furthermore it does not seem to me that all of the provisions of the proposal are related to each other and if are inconsistent with each other.

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

December 43

COLONEL BUXTON

For your information. If you approve I suggest that Colonel Hapner's letter, minus the first and last paragraphs and with the attachment, be disseminated to General Magruder, Mr. Scribner, Dr. Rogers, Mr. Shepardon, Lt. Dolan, Major Lincoln, and Major McDonough.

[Signature]
B. C. Lee

*Office proposed
distribution - G.S.B.*

Office of the Secretariat

SECRET

9 printed

(1911)

* Hambleton
 5-4-3 Comm. Th.
 * Ferris
 * Pownall

Herpin
Powhat

11. REMARKS:

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Abstract

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Abstract

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